Posts Tagged ‘AMU’
For my fellow military history graduate students who have before or behind you the excellent course, Studies in U.S. Military History, you won’t want to miss Episode 1 of the new American Experience series, “We Shall Remain.” Tonight’s episode, “After the Mayflower,” includes an excellent summary of King Phillip’s War. It can be replayed online at PBS here.
Jill Lepore, author of the book, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (Vintage Books, 1999) which was required reading for the course, contributes significantly to the film. I wrote a brief post about her book back in September which you can (read here). Dr. Lepore is David Woods Kemper ’41 Professor of American History at Harvard University.
Highly Recommend both the series and the book!
Class started on Monday. See post titled Next Course – Civil War Strategy and Tactics.
We’re beginning, and appropriately so, by exploring Jomini’s influence. Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini. If you search for him on my blog, you’ll see quite a few references including a series I did titled “Jomini on the Nature of War.”
Part I: Introduction is available here,
Part II: The Burgeoning Military Theorist here,
Part III: The Founder of Modern Strategy here,
Part IV: The Basics here,
Part V: Lines of Operation here, and
Part VI – The Conduct of War here.
Also, Scientific Optimism: Jomini and the U.S. Army
Ah the thrill of the sound of book boxes being dropped on my front porch and then the doorbell ringing. Nothing like it!!
I had to put them on my bookcase where I won’t open them until after finals. Too much to do before the term ends. Torture.
Apologies for short post. Know you’ll understand. Two papers due by Sunday and need to read the last two chapters of Holt.
I just registered for my next course, Civil War Strategy and Tactics, which will start March 2nd. Book list looks terrific and is on order. It’s also loaded on my virtual bookshelves which you can access by clicking on any of the books. I’ve updated “the courses” page here.
Course Description: This course is a study of the American Civil War with emphasis on operational contributions of Union and Confederate military leadership. Students examine Civil War battles on two levels: the strategic doctrine as formed by the major commanders and tactical developments that affected the conduct of battle at a lower echelon of command. Special emphasis is on the interplay between these levels in order to gain a comprehensive view of strategy and tactics in both armies from 1861-1865.
My current course on Studies in U. S. Military History (see courses page here) is drawing to a close. We have been examining the last of Millett and Maslowski’s major themes which is that “the United States has used increasingly sophisticated technology to overcome logistical limitations and to match enemy numbers with firepower.” [i] I find this supportable in the sense that it has been possible to see a steady progression of technological prowess over time. Nowhere, arguably, have technological advancements been felt more than in the arena of weaponry.
Professor of history Alex Roland (Duke University) posits that “before the twentieth century, most soldiers and sailors ended their careers armed as they were at the beginning. New weapons were introduced slowly, if at all, and most professionals resisted the uncertainties new arms introduced.” But, Roland asserts, “by the second half of the twentieth century, this traditional suspicion of new weapons had changed to a reckless enthusiasm.” The phenomena of obsolescence on introduction entered the national psyche in that, by the time many “weapons entered service, their successors were being planned. This was especially true in large-scale weapons systems such as ships and aircraft. It even found its way into thinking about less complex military technologies, such as radios and computers.” [ii]
More in Part 2. Note I provide a link below to Professor Roland’s excellent article titled “Technology and War” which can be read online.
[i] Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, xiii.
[ii] Alex Roland, “Technology and War,” http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_4/roland2.html Accessed 13 July 2008.
This post continues the series of “Jomini on the Nature of War.” Part I: Introduction is available here, Part II: The Burgeoning Military Theorist here, Part III: The Founder of Modern Strategy here, Part IV: The Basics here, and Part V: Lines of Operation here.
Jomini cautions that there are a number of other circumstances that can affect the “nature and conduct of war” including that…
- “a state may simply make war against another state
- a state may make war against several states in alliance with each other
- a state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy
- a state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary
- in the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced.
- the theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own.
- if the war be one of invasions, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous
- it may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy
- the war may be a civil or a religious war.”[i]
He insists that war should always “be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but [that] great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case.”[ii] “A regiment should always fight in nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances and events.”[iii]
So the “principles of strategy are always the same,” but differences occur with the “political part of war, which is modified by the tone of communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of states and armies.”[iv]
Jomini outlines these specific circumstances in a description of each type of war and the principles and rules to follow (or not follow) in every one. For example, in “Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights,” he indicates that no rules can be laid down but to watch and to profit by every circumstance.[v] This leads to his conclusion that “war knows no rules.”[vi]
“Military science rests upon principle which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed.”[vii]
[i] Jomini, Antoine Henri de. The Art of War, trans. by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill., Special Edition, (El Paso: EL Paso Norte Press. 2005), 10-11.
[iv] Ibid., 13.
[v] Ibid., 12.
This post continues the series of “Jomini on the Nature of War.” Part I: Introduction is available here, Part II: The Burgeoning Military Theorist here, Part III: The Founder of Modern Strategy here, and Part IV: The Basics here.
“Principles were guides to action, not infallible mathematical calculations. The specific application of principles would vary with the thousand changing physical and psychological factors that made war ‘a great drama.’ Genius would defeat the military pendant, just as talent and experience would outdo the bumbling novice. But the principles themselves, whose truth is demonstrated by all military experience, could not be ignored without peril and, when followed, had ‘almost invariably’ (Presque en tout temps) brought victory.”[i]
Jomini’s arguments for “immutable ‘principle’ of war” rested on the concept of “lines of operation” by which he meant…
- “where an armed force fights,
- for what objective, and
- in what force relative to the total available military power of the state.”[ii]
He identified two types of lines of operation, those that are:
- deserts, and
- sheer distance through, over, and around which military operations must be conducted.”[iii]
- Also included in this category are man-made, permanent structures that constrict the conduct of warfare including: fortifications, military bases, political boundaries and road networks.[iv]
- Concerned exclusively with strategic choice about:
- where to fight,
- to what purpose,
- in what force, etc.[v]
[i - v] John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 154, 166.
Photo: Union entrenchments near Kenesaw Mountain, Ga., 1864. 111-B-531. The National Archives.
Map: First Manasas